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Abstract— Chosen-ciphertext security, which guarantees confidentiality of encrypted messages even in the presence of a decryption oracle, has become 
the de facto notion of security for public-key encryption under active attack. In this manuscript, for the first time, we propose a new approach for 
constructing post-quantum cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2-secure) in the standard model using the knapsack 
problem. The computational version of the knapsack problem is NP-hard. Thus, this problem is expected to be difficult to solve using quantum 
computers. Our construction is a precoding-based encryption algorithm and uses the knapsack problem to perform a permutation and pad random 
fogged data to the message bits. Compared to other approaches in use today, our approach is more efficient and its CCA2 security in quantum 
environment can be reduced in the standard model to the assumption that the knapsack problem is intractable. Furthermore, we show that our 
approach is a general paradigm and can be applying to any (post-quantum) trapdoor one-way function candidate. 
 
Index Terms— CCA2-security, Encoding, Knapsack problem, Post-quantum cryptosystem, Standard model 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE notion of public-key cryptography was introduced by Diffy and Hellman [18] and the ultimate goal of public-key 
encryption is the production of a simple and efficient encryption scheme that is provably secure in a strong security model 
under a weak and reasonable computational assumption. The accepted notion for the security of a public-key encryption scheme 
is semantically secure against adaptive chose ciphertext attack (i.e. IND-CCA2) [37]. In this scenario, the adversary has seen the 
challenge ciphertext before having access to the decryption oracle. The adversary is not allowed to ask the decryption of the 
challenge ciphertext, but can obtain the decryption of any relevant cryptogram (even modified ones based on the challenge 
ciphertext). A cryptosystem is said to be CCA2-secure if the cryptanalyst fails to obtain any partial information about the 
plaintext relevant to the challenge cryptogram.  
In order to design CCA2-secure cryptosystems, a lot of successes were reached but these successes tend to fall into two 
categories: the production of very efficient encryption schemes with security proofs in random oracle models, and the production 
of less efficient encryption schemes with full proofs of security in standard models. The ultimate prize has yet to be claimed. The 
random oracle model was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [5]. In this model, hash functions are considered to be ideal, i.e. 
perfectly random. We stress that although a proof in the random oracle model has a certain value it is still only a heuristic 
security argument for any implementation of the scheme. In particular, there exist cryptographic schemes that are provably 
secure in the random oracle model yet that are insecure with any possible standard model instantiation of the hash function [10]. 
The approaches for constructing encryption schemes secure in the standard model (i.e., without the use of heuristics such as 
random oracles) tend to fall several categories [17]. 
 The first approach is to use a “double-and-add” technique, in which a message is encrypted twice and a checksum value is 
added to the ciphertext. We can divide these schemes in two categories: The NIZK Schemes [33] and the Cramer-Shoup 
encryption Scheme [16]. 
 Signature and identity-based schemes are another approach for constructing IND-CCA2 scheme. The Canetti-Halevi-Katz 
transform [11] and the Dolev-Dwork-Naor scheme [19] are the most important cases in this area. 
 Extracting plaintext awareness is the third technique. Two methods are used: plaintext awareness via key registration and 
using Extractors [4, 21]. 
The cryptosystems were introduced with the above techniques are based on assumptions related to the integer factoring (IF) 
and discrete logarithm (DL) problems, such as: decisional quadratic residuosity (DQR) assumption, Paillier’s decisional 
composite residuosity (DCR) assumption, RSA assumption, decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, Computational 
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (BCDH) assumption, etc. In 1994, Shor [42] 
conceived a polynomial-time algorithm which solves IFP and DLP using quantum computers. Therefore, these schemes cannot 
be used to provide security protections any longer and public-key cryptosystems secure in quantum computing environments 
need to be developed. Public-key cryptosystems that can resist these emerging attacks are called quantum resistant or post-
quantum cryptosystems. 
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A. Related work 
There are mainly four classes of public-key cryptography that are believed to resist quantum attacks [6].  
 Lattice-based cryptography 
 Code-based cryptography 
 Hash-based digital signature schemes 
 Multivariate cryptography 
Each approach has unique advantages and disadvantages. It has been shown that many of these post-quantum cryptosystems 
are not CCA2-secure [7, 23] and most of the cryptosystems have been proposed to deal with CCA2 adversaries are in the random 
oracle model. In recent years, Lattice-based and Code-based cryptography have been further considered in the design of post-
quantum CCA2-secure cryptosystem. Here we present a summary of the work done in each case. 
 Lattice-based cryptography. For the first time, Peikert and Waters [35] propose a CCA1-secure cryptosystem based on the 
worst-case hardness of lattice problems using the notion of lossy All-But-One (ABO) trapdoor functions. Subsequently, 
Peikert [36] showed how to construct a correlation-secure trapdoor function family from the learning with errors (LWE) 
problem, and used it within the Rosen-Segev scheme [40] to obtain another lattice-based CCA1-secure scheme. 
Unfortunately, the latter scheme suffers from long public-key and ciphertext length of 2( )n
 
in the security parameter n , 
even if applied in the Ring-LWE setting [43]. Recently, Micciancio and Peikert [31] give new methods for generating 
simpler, tighter, faster and smaller trapdoors in cryptographic lattices to achieve a CCA1-secure cryptosystem. Their 
methods involve a new kind of trapdoor, and include specialized algorithms for inverting LWE, randomly sampling SIS 
preimages, and securely delegating trapdoors. More constructions of IND-CCA2 secure lattice-based encryption schemes 
can be obtained by using the lattice-based selective-ID secure identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes of [1, 2, 3, 39] 
within the generic construction of [8], and a one-time signature or commitment scheme. Recently, Steinfeld et al. [43] 
introduced the first CCA2 secure variant of the NTRU in the standard model with a provable security from worst-case 
problems in ideal lattices. They construct a CCA1-secure scheme using the lossy trapdoor function framework of Peikert 
and Waters, which they generalize to the case of ( 1)k  -of- k -correlated input distributions.  
For full CCA2 security and non-malleability, all the above schemes suggest using a strongly unforgeable one-time 
signature scheme, a message authentication code (MAC) or commitment scheme for transfer CCA1-secure schemes to a 
CCA2-secure one. So, all of these approaches require separate encryption and checksum operations. Hence, the resulting 
encryption schemes require two expensive calculations. 
 Code-based cryptography. The first cryptosystem based on the hardness of decoding random linear codes was presented in 
1978 by McEliece [27]. The first CCA2-secure variant of McEliece scheme in the random oracle model is the conversions of 
Kobara and Imai [26]. Recently, Cayrel et al. [13] present efficient implementations of McEliece variants using quasi-dyadic 
codes. They provide secure parameters for a classical McEliece encryption scheme based on quasi-dyadic generalized 
Srivastava codes, and convert their scheme to a CCA2-secure one in the random oracle model by applying the Fujisaki-
Okamoto transform. For the first time, Döttling et al. [20] showed how we can construct CCA2-secure McEliece variant 
cryptosystem using correlated products in the standard model. They construct IND-CPA verifiable k-repetition McEliece 
scheme by modifying Nojima et al. [34] randomized version of the McEliece with Bernoulli error distribution. Their scheme 
obtains CCA2-security in the standard model by using one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme.  
All the above concrete constructions of lossy trapdoor function and correlated inputs function are based on decisional 
assumptions [25, 28]. It is widely believed that computational assumptions are more standard than their decisional versions. 
Furthermore, IND-CCA2 for almost all proposed post-quantum cryptosystems is based on strongly unforgeable one-time 
signature schemes (or MACs). The drawback of the one-time signature schemes is that one key-pair consisting of a secret 
signature key and a public verification key can only be used to sign and verify a single document. This is inadequate for most 
applications [6]. Moreover, both the double-and-add schemes and the identity-based schemes require separate encryption and 
checksum operations. Hence, the resulting encryption schemes require two expensive calculations. 
B. Motivation 
Challenges in the post-quantum cryptography include efficiency, reliability and usability. Motivated by the task of 
constructing a simple and efficient public-key encryption scheme which is post-quantum CCA2-secure in the standard model, we 
initiate the study of NP-hard problems for constructing such schemes. It is believed that the quantum computer cannot solve NP-
hard problems.  The knapsack problem has proven to be NP-complete. The computational version of the knapsack problem is 
NP-hard, thus this problem is expected to be one of the difficult problems against the quantum computer. The knapsack scheme 
is also attractive at the standpoint of encryption and decryption speed. Only integer additions are required for the encryption in 
the knapsack scheme. This feature confers a practical advantage that the encryption can be lightly implemented on small IC 
chips. 
C. Overview 
We introduce a novel approach for constructing CCA2-secure post-quantum cryptosystem in the standard model based on the 
knapsack problem. Our construction is a randomized precoding-based algorithm and uses the knapsack problem to perform a 
permutation and pad random fogged data to the message bits. For this reason, we firstly choose a random binary string 
1 2{ , , , } {0,1}
n
n rx x x  and then use it to divide message bits into several blocks with equal length v . Then, some random fogged 
blocks (RFBs) with equal length s are padded to the message blocks. Encoding information includes position of the message (and 
RFB) blocks and the lengths of them are encrypted with a secure knapsack-based PKC and send to the receiver. Since encryption 
and decryption in the knapsack-based cryptosystems are very fast, compared to other approaches, our method is very efficient. 
The main novelty is that we introduce a heuristic encoding algorithm and correlate the encoding parameters to the knapsack 
problem. Thus, the CCA2 adversary for extracting the message from challenge cryptogram must first recover encoding 
parameters from the knapsack-based cryptosystem. Our proof makes direct use of the fact that the underlying primitive is a 
trapdoor one-way permutation, rather than the knapsack problem and the scheme’s consistency check can be directly 
implemented by the simulator without having access to some external gap-oracle (as in [8, 9, 24]) or using other extrinsic 
rejection techniques (such as “hash proof systems” [1, 5, 16] or “twinning” [12]). Thus, our proof technique is fundamentally 
different from all known approaches to obtain CCA security.  
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows: In the following section, we briefly explain some mathematical 
background and definitions. Then, in Section 3, we introduce our proposed scheme. Performance and security analysis of this 
cryptosystem will be discussed in Section 4 and finally, in section 5, we will give a general form of the proposed scheme that can 
be applying to any (post-quantum) trapdoor one-way function candidate. 
 
II. PRELIMINARY 
A. Notation 
We will use standard notation. If X is a string, then X denotes its length. If k then  0,1
k
denote the set of k-bit strings, 1k
denote a string of k ones and 
*
0,1 denote the set of bit strings of finite length. y x denotes the assignment to y of the value x. 
For a set S, s S  denote the assignment to s of a uniformly random element of S. For a deterministic algorithmA , we write
( , )x y z OA to mean that x is assigned the output of running A on inputs y and z, with access to oracleO . If A
 
is a 
probabilistic algorithm, we may write ( , , )x y z R OA
 
to mean the output of A when run on inputs y and z with oracle access to 
O
 
and using the random coins R . If we do not specify R then we implicitly assume that the coins are selected uniformly at 
random from  0,1

. This is denoted ( , )x y z OA . We denote by EPr[ ] the probability that the event E  occurs. If a
 
and b
 
are 
two strings of bits, we denote by a b| | their concatenation. The bit-length of a
 
denoted by Len( )a , 
1
Lsb ( )x a  
means the right 1x
bits of a  and 
2
Msb ( )x a  means the left 2x bits of a.  
B. Public-Key Encryption Schemes 
A public-key encryption scheme is defined as follows: 
Definition 1: (Public-key encryption). A public-key encryption scheme (PKE) is a triple of probabilistic polynomial time 
(PPT) algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec)  such that: 
 Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which takes a security parameter 1k  as input and outputs a 
public-key pk and a secret-key sk . We write ( , ) (1 )
kpk sk G . The public-key specifies the message space ( )MsgSp pk  and 
the ciphertext space ( )CiphSp sk .  
 Enc is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm which takes as input a public key pk, a 
( )MsgSpm pk  and random coins r , and outputs a ciphertext ( )C pkCiphSp . We write pk m; rEnc( , )  to indicate explicitly 
that the random coins r is used and pk mEnc( , )  if fresh random coins are used.  
 Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret-key sk and a ciphertext 
( )C pkCiphSp , and outputs either a message ( )m pkMsgSp
 
or an error symbol  . We write Dec( , )m C sk . 
 (Completeness) For any pair of public and secret-keys generated by Gen and any message ( )m pkMsgSp it holds that
Dec( ; Enc( , ))sk pk m;r m
 
with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen  and the random coins r used by 
Enc . 
Semantic security (a.k.a. indistinguishability) against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is the strongest known 
notion of security for the public-key encryption schemes. This notion of security simply means that a cryptogram should not 
reveal any useful information about the message. This type of attack is the most powerful attack, which is defined by Rackoff 
and Simon [37]. In this scenario, the adversary has seen the challenge cryptogram before having access to the decryption oracle. 
The adversary is not allowed to ask the decryption of the challenge cryptogram, but can obtain the decryption of any relevant 
cryptogram (even modified ones based on the challenge cryptogram). A cryptosystem is said to be IND-CCA2 secure if the 
cryptanalyst fails to obtain any partial information about the plaintext relevant to the challenge cryptogram. This notion is known 
to suffice for many applications of encryption in the presence of active attackers including secure P2P transmission, secure 
communication, auctions, voting schemes, and many others. Indeed, CCA security is now widely accepted as the standard 
security notion for public-key encryption schemes. In recent years, attempt to design cryptosystems secure against adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attack is increased, but no efficient cryptosystems in the standard model were introduced.  
Definition2 (CCA2-security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (i.e. 
IND-CCA2) if the advantage of any two-stage PPT adversary 1 2( , )A A A  
in the following experiment is negligible in the 
security parameter k : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The attacker may query a decryption oracle with a ciphertext C at any point during its execution, with the exception that 2A  
is not allowed to query Dec( ,.)sk with *C . The decryption oracle returns 2
sk'b C state
Dec( ,.) *( , )A . The attacker wins the game if 
b b' and the probability of this event is defined as 2cca kPKE,Pr[Exp ( )]A . We define the advantage of A  in the experiment as 
IND-CCA-2 2 11
2
ccak k  PKE, PKE,Adv ( ) Pr[Exp ( ) ]A A .             
A. Knapsack-based public-key cryptosystem 
Knapsack public-key encryption schemes are based on the subset sum problem. The subset sum problem is to find the solution 
1 2( , , , ) {0,1}
n
nx x x   
such that 1 1 2 2 , n nC a x a x a x    for given positive integers 1 2, , , na a a and C which is the sum of a 
subset of the ia . This problem is known to be NP-hard [30, 32]. Thus, the subset sum problem is expected to be hard to solve 
using quantum computers. The knapsack scheme is also attractive at the standpoint of light-weight encryption. In the public-key 
schemes using DLP or IFP, the large modulo exponentiations are required for the encryption and decryption. This operation is a 
little bit heavy to implement on small IC chips. On the other hand, only integer additions are required for the encryption in the 
knapsack scheme. This feature confers a practical advantage that the encryption can be lightly implemented on small IC chips 
and can be performed in much shorter time than the schemes using DLP or IFP. These reasons described above have motivated 
us to investigate knapsack-based public-key cryptosystems. 
The first knapsack-based PKC was introduced by Merkle and Hellman [29]. Since its proposal, knapsack-based PKC have 
been widely studied and many knapsack-based PKCs were developed. Nevertheless, many knapsack cryptosystems were shown 
insecure against some known attacks, such as low density attack [14], Shamir’s attack [41], and lattice basis reduction algorithms 
[38], etc. The basic idea is to select an instance of the subset sum problem that is easy to solve, and then disguise it as an instance 
of the general subset sum problem, which is hopefully difficult to solve. The original knapsack set can serve as the private key, 
while the transformed knapsack set serves as the public key [30].  
I. THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM 
In this section, we introduced our proposed encryption scheme. Our scheme is a precoding-based algorithm that uses knapsack 
problem for performing a permutation and pad random fogged data to the message. 
A. The Proposed Idea 
Let we can decide to encrypt message 0 1{ , }nm  with ( )Len m n . For perform a randomized encoding to the message, we 
firstly choose a random binary vector 1 2( , , , ) lX x x x  with hamming weigh h  where 1
l
ii
h x . We will call this vector 
cargo (carrier) vector which carries the encoding information. If h½n , then /n h is not an integer and we pad a random binary 
string (RBS) with length h n h n  .  to the right of m. Otherwise, /n h is an integer and we don’t need to pad a RBS to the right 
of m. In each case, we can divide m into h blocks 1 2 ... hd d d|| || || with binary length v n h     where  
2
PKE,Exp ( ):
cca kA  
1( , ) Gen( ) kpk sk  
0 1 0 11 s.t.
Dec( ,.)( , , ) ( ) skm m state pk m mA
   
{0,1}b
 
* Enc( , ) bC pk m  
2
sk'b C state
Dec( ,.) *( , )A
 
If 'b b return 1, else return 0.
  
1Lsb ( ( ). ) RBSh md n h n h      || . Thus, if h n∣ , then RBS   (the empty set) and 1Lsb ( ( ). )h md n h n h      , else, RBS is a 
random block with binary length .h n h n    and we have 1Lsb ( ( ). ) RBSh md n h n h      || . 
We perform a random permutation and pad some random fogged blocks (RFBs) with equal binary length s  into the message 
blocks 1id i h ,  using permutation function        0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
v v s
f   : , , , , , that can be defined as follows: 
1
0
i i'
i i i
i
d if x
f x d d
if x

  

( , )
RFB
 . 
Notice that in order to prevent excessive increase in the message length, we can choose s small enough. The message 
1 2
' ' '
lm' d d d ( ... )|| || ||  is called encoded message. We summarize encoding process in algorithm1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We illustrate algorithm1 with small example. Suppose 1 2 127( , , , )m m m m and (0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0)X  . 
SETUP: 
We have 127Len( )m n  , 18l  , 
1
11
l
ii
h x

  . Since 11½127 so 12v n h     and we must pad a random block with length 
5Len( . )h n h n     to the right of m. If we randomly chose 1 0 1 1 0, , , , , we have 1 2 127
5
1 0 1 1 0
Len{ }
( , , , , , , , , )m m m m . Since 11h , the 
algorithm divides m into 11 blocks with equal length 12v  . We have 
1 2 11
1 12 13 24 121 127( ,..., , , .. 1 0 1. , , , , , , , )1 0
d d d
m m m m m m m . 
Which 121 1271 7Lsb ( ( ). ) Lsb ( ) , ,m mn h n h m m      . 
PERMUTATION AND PADDING: 
Firstly, we choose random integer s, say 4s . We have 
1 0x , thus 1 1 0 11 0RFB# ( )
'd , , ,   where (0,1,1,0)
 
is randomly chosen by algorithm1.  
2 1x  , thus 2
1
2 1
jj
'
x
d d d

 

. 
Algorithm1: Permutation and random data padding 
Input: 1 2( , , , )nm m m m and random binary vector 1 2( , , , ) lX x x x . 
Output: Encoded message 1 2
' ' '
lm' d d d ( ... )|| || || . 
SETUP: 
1. If h n|
 
then v n h ;
 
else 
v n h     and choose a  RBS with Len ( . )h n h n    
and 1 2
.
( , , , RBS ))n
h n h n
m m m m
  
 ; 
2. Divide m  into h blocks 1 2( ... )hd d d|| || ||  with 1id v, i h  Len( ) . 
PERMUTATION AND PADDING: 
1. Randomly chose integer s . 
2. For 1 toi l  do: 
If 1ix then
1
i
jj
'
i x
d d



; 
else 
'
id RFB with binary length s . 
Return 1 2
' ' '
lm' d d d ( ... )|| || ||  
 
3 0x  , thus 3 2 1 0 1 0RFB# ( )
'd , , ,  where (1,0,1,0)
 
is randomly chosen by algorithm1. 
. 
. 
. 
17 1x , thus 17
1
17 11
jj
'
x
d d d

 

. 
18 0x , thus 18 7 0 0 1 0RFB# ( )
'd , , ,   where 0 0 1 0( , , , )  is randomly chosen by algorithm1.  
l h  RFB blocks with equal length 4s   
are combined with the message blocks , 1id i h  , to produce the encoded message
1 2( ... )
' ' ' '
lm d d d . In the final, algorithm output m'  as 
1 32 17
1 12 121 127 1 00 1 1 0 1 0 1 00 1 1, ,( ,...,, , , , ... , , , , , , ,
' '' 'd dd d
m' m m m m  
18
0,0,1 0),
'd
.  
As we see, the length and position of the message blocks are correlated to the number and position of 1, 1ix i l    
respectively, and completely random.  
B. The proposed scheme 
1) Key Generation Algorithm  
Suppose Knap Knap Knap(Gen Enc Dec ), ,   be a secure knapsack-based PKE and 1 2( , , , )lb b b  be the secret key and 
1 2{( , , , ), }la a a M  be the public key, where 1
l
ii
M a

 is a module.  
2) Encryption algorithm 
To encrypt message 0 1{ , }nm , the sender do the following steps: 
 Choose random cargo vector 1 2( , , , )lX x x x  
with hamming weight h. Execute algorithm1 for generate encoded 
message 1 2( ... )
' ' ' '
lm d d d from message m . 
 Suppose y be the decimal representation of 'm . Compute: 
1C yr h    
,  2 Knap
1
Enc ( ) .
l
i i
i
C X a x

 
 
and  send ciphertext 1 2( , )C C C to the receiver. Fig.1 shows the encryption process. 
Generate  pseudorandom binary 
vector  
Encoding
Process
y.r+h
Knapsack-based 
cryptosystem
Message m, with Len(n)
Data path
Process path
1 2 ... lx x x
1 2 ... nm m m
1 2( , ,..., )lx x x
y
1 2 ... hd d d
1 2 1... l ld' d' d' d'
Ciphertext 
2CCiphertext 1C
h
 
Fig.1: Encryption Process 
 
3) Decryption algorithm 
Receiver after receiving 1 2( , )C C C , performs the following steps for extract message m :   
 Compute random binary vector 1 2( , , , )lX x x x  
as Knap 2Dec ( )X C , 1 
l
i ih x and v n h   / . 
 Compute 1( ) /y C h r  .  
 Suppose m'  be the binary coded decimal (BCD) representation of y . Computes (Len( ) ) / ( )s m' n l h     and reject the 
ciphertext if s is not an integers (consistency check). 
 The lengths and position of the message (and RFB) blocks are explicit, therefore, the receiver simply can separate RFB 
blocks from encoded message m'  and extract message blocks 1,id i h  with the following algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 2: Extractor 
Input: 1 2( , , , )lX x x x , 1 
l
i ih x , s and m'  
Output: Message 1 2( ... )hm d d d || || || . 
1. For 1 toi l  do: 
         If 0ix  then m' sm' m' Len( )Lsb ( ) ; 
         else 
         
1
i
jj
v
x
d m'



Msb ( ) and m' vm' m' Len( )Lsb ( ) ; 
2. 
1
1 2( ... )l
jj
x
m d d d



|| || ||  
3. If h½n , then nm mMsb ( ) (remove right h n h n  ( . )  bits of m). 
Return “ m ” 
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